This paper investigates the impact of geographical neighbors on the political instability of a country and the role of a country's international relations in shaping the impact of its geographical neighbors. First, we show that political instability in neighbor countries has a strong positive impact on a given country's political instability.
Introduction
Politics and economics are closely interrelated in modern societies. Changes in political power lead to changes in economic policy, and the evolution of an economy over time influences political attitudes. Understanding the determinants of political and economic indicators is complicated by the fact that economies do not evolve in isolation. International relations, including trade, political and military linkages, may shape the characteristics and the development path of a given economy. A nation can strategically choose other countries as economic partners to facilitate economic growth. It can become a member of economic, military, or other blocks that support a particular ideology or development strategy. At the same time, a country may find itself surrounded by social and political unrest due to events in neighbor countries. We can distinguish between the international influence considered inherent by a country, indicated by factors such as social ties with geographical neighbors, and international influence that is adopted and modifiable, such as a country's main international trade partners. The latter, being an outcome of a country's policies, could potentially impose the peer effects desired by policymakers. The former has been widely discussed in the literature as the "neighborhood effect" (see Topa and Zenou, 2015; Ioannides and Topa, 2010; and Durlauf, 2004 for recent reviews of the related studies, including various applications). A neighborhood can impose positive or negative peer effects, depending on its characteristics.
Whenever a neighborhood has undesirable effects, policies aimed at dissipating its impact through deeper international relations may be a remedy.
In this study we analyze the impact of geographical neighbors on the political instability of a country and the role of a country's international relations in shaping the impact of its geographical neighbors. We use two different measures of political instability, the traditional index by the World Bank and a new measure of political turnover constructed using the Archidos dataset (Goemans et al., 2009 ). We employ the neighbors neighbors' average political instability and the average neighbors' latitude squared as instruments for the average neighbors' political instability to identify the causal effect on a given country's political instability. We show that the neighbors' instability positively and significantly affects a country's political instability. This result is robust to inclusion of the fundamental factors considered to be the main determinants of political instability.
Given that geographical neighbors are a fixed factor that cannot be altered, it is crucial to recognize efficient methods of counteracting its possible negative impact on another country's economy. International economic relations look like the most straightforward solution. By diverting resources to politically stable and economically successful economies, a country can reduce the social connections with its neighbors and, potentially, the negative impact of politically unstable neighbors. To that end, we investigate whether more intensive international relations can reduce the impact of a country's neighbors on its political instability.
We consider three different categories of measures of intensity of international relations: participation in international intergovernmental organizations, trade openness, and the characteristics of main trade partners. We obtain several results. First, in general, more active participation in international governmental organizations is associated with lower impact of neighbors' political instability on a given country's political instability. Second, greater openness to trade does not significantly reduce the impact of neighbors' political instability on a given country's political instability. Third, a country's dependence on neighbors can be reduced when six or more main trade partners are non-neighbors. The main trade partnersnonneighbors tend to be much more politically stable and economically developed than main trade partners-neighbors. Thus, international relations can be an efficient counterforce to the negative influence of geographical neighbors, and it is used in practice.
Quantifying the effects of political distortions imposed by politically unstable neighbor countries and the counteracting effect of international relations with non-neighbor countries is important from an economic and policy standpoint. From economic perspective, a nation's government budget should be correctly adjusted for the expenses necessary to maintain political stability given the situation in its neighbor countries. From policy perspective, the economic strategy of a country may depend on the expected impact of a particular international partner on its political stability and economic performance. These issues are of particular importance for developing countries located in politically unstable regions and aiming to escape the poverty trap. The problem is that such countries usually have a limited ability to form relations with their preferred economies. Political instability, bad investment climates, and policy uncertainty frighten off potential investors and trade partners. In this case, the lead to cooperate from more economically and politically successful countries can be crucial.
Our findings suggest that recent trends in the politics of developed countries like nations in the European Union, the United States, and Canada, which tend to impose sanctions on economies characterized by political unrest, at the same time, encouraging the neighbors of these economies to interact more with developed countries by offering special trade agreements, should reduce political instability in the countries surrounded by politically unstable neighbors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the concept of political instability, its definition, measures, and determinants. It also evaluates the impact of the average neighbors' political instability on a given country's political instability. Section 3 discusses the role of international relations in shaping the impact of geographical neighbors on a country's political instability. Section 4 concludes.
The International Nature of Political Instability
Political instability is a broad concept that can refer to the likelihood of riots, revolutions and other forms of violence as well as to the probability of major changes in the government such as those caused by re-elections (according to the definition by the World Bank). When political instability is used to describe the political elections and changes in the government, it is also referred to as political turnover or political uncertainty.
Political instability has a strong and direct effect on economic performance through a number of channels. Several studies have shown that political frictions in the form of political instability and polarization are the main cause of public debt (Persson and Svensson, 1989 ; Alesina and Tabellini, 1990), high distortionary taxes and government overspending (Battaglini and Coate, 2008; Yared, 2010) , lead to lower levels of output and investment constructed probability of political turnover is zero for some countries. For the World Bank measure, we compute the averages over 1996-2014 to obtain the cross-section data.
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We denote the political instability measure from the World Bank as PIS 1 and the political turnover measure based on the Archidos data as PIS 2. The correlation between these two political instability measures is 0.50. Table 6 in the Appendix reports the summary statistics for these and other variables for the entire sample of countries for which the data is available and for developing countries separately. Political instability is significantly larger in developing world, consistent with the fact that the quality of institutions is strongly correlated with economic development. The determinants of the dynamics of political instability are less understood, partially due to the reverse causality. (such as location and characteristics of neighbors) and international economic linkages (such as the number of trading partners and their characteristics) can shape the nature of political instability in a country. By studying the role of these factors, we aim to contribute to the discussion on how to improve economic performance by improving the political climate in a country.
The Neighbor Effect
Recent research has demonstrated that regional instability, defined as political instability in neighbor countries, has a strong negative effect on a country's economic performance.
In particular, Ades and Chua (1997) discussed the implications for a country's economy of having politically unstable neighbors, calling the phenomenon "the neighbor's curse."
The idea is that having politically unstable geographical neighbors influences a country's pattern of government spending and investment, leading to lower economic growth rates (macroeconomic effect). Besides, political instability in neighbor countries can affect political attitudes in a given economy through social interactions, imposing further distortions on economic development (microeconomic effect).
In this section, we discuss the importance of regional instability for political instability in a given country. We define neighbors of a country as the countries that have common borders with a given country. The criterion of having the common borders is important for our purposes. Social networks play a role in shaping political opinions (Axelrod, 1997; Baldassarri and Bearman, 2007; and Iversen and Soskice, 2015) . The citizens from the countries which share common borders are more likely to interact with each other through travels, common relatives, similar culture and ethnicity. The social proximity combined with geographical proximity that characterizes contiguous countries can give rise to the "neighborhood effect," defined as a significant impact of the regional characteristics on a given country (Topa and Zenou, 2015) .
As a measure of neighbors' political instability, which we denote AN P IS, we use the average political instability computed over all the neighbors of a country. We also tried the weighted average neighbors' political instability with weights defined by the neighbors' characteristics such as area, population size, and real GDP per capita, for robustness checks.
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The correlations between the weighted and unweighted average neighbors' political instability measures is above 0.95 and the results reported in this paper are not affected significantly by different weightings. Therefore, we only report the results for the unweighted averages.
As a starting point, we compare the political instability across different groups of countries. Table 1 reports the results. We observe that the countries which have contiguous geographical neighbors are much more politically unstable and have higher political turnover than the island countries with no contiguous neighbors. This implies that there is some association between the regional instability and a given country instability. Furthermore, on average, the political instability of a country's contiguous neighbors is much higher than the political instability of a country's main trading partner. These results hold regardless of the level of economic development. Looking at the main trade partners only, the political instability of the main trade partners-neighbors is significantly higher than the political instability of the main trade partners-nonneighbors when the whole sample of countries is considered or when the sample is restricted to developing countries. In developed countries, the opposite pattern holds: the political instability of the main trade partners-nonneighbors is significantly higher than the political instability of the main trading partners-neighbors. We rely on these observations to formulate the following hypothesis: countries use trading partners to reduce the negative impact of their neighbors' political instability. Before testing this hypothesis in the next section, we analyze the dependence of a country's political instability on its partners' political instability in more detail.
Given that political instability is to a great extent determined by the fundamental factors such as geographical location and ethnolinguistic fractionalization, a given country's and its neighbors' political instability may be jointly determined by the regional factors. Indeed, when classified by regions, the political instability of a country and its neighbors move closely together, with correlation 0.90 across all the countries in the sample. Figure 3 reports the average country's political instability and the average neighbors' political instability by region. There is high variability in political instability by region with Scandinavian region being the most politically stable and Central Asia being the most politically unstable.
We quantify the relationship between a country's and its neighbors' political instability using OLS and IV approaches to estimate the following model:
where P IS i denotes country i's measure of political instability, AN P IS i denotes country i's average neighbors' political instability, and X i is a set of country-specific control variables.
When P IS is measured by PIS 1, AN P IS is measured by the average neighbor countries' PIS 1; and when P IS is measured by PIS 2, AN P IS is measured by the average neighbor countries' PIS 2. The control variables include the logarithm of population, the logarithm of area in kilometers squared, latitude squared, longitude, and ethnolinguistic fractionalization.
For robustness check, we also consider an extended version of the model where the logarithm of real GDP per capita and democracy index for a given country and the averages of neighbor countries' area and population are included as additional controls. 5 The data on control variables is from the World Bank, except for ethnolinguistic fractionalization which is taken from Alesina et al., (2003) . The summary statistics are in Table 6 in the Appendix. Table 2 reports the estimates, for all countries in the sample and for the sample restricted to developing countries.
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The coefficient of the average neighbors' political instability is positive, significant, and robust to the inclusion of controls in all the specifications except for the case when PIS 2 is the dependent variable and the logarithm of real GDP per capita is included as a control (Columns (3) and (8) in the bottom panel of Table 2 ).
Given that the dependent and explanatory political instability measures can be jointly determined by the geographical or historical factors, and a given country can influence the political climate of its neighbors, we instrument the average neighbors' political instability by the average neighbors neighbors' political instability, excluding the country for which the average neighbors' political instability is calculated, and by the average neighbors' latitude squared.
The idea behind the first instrument is that even though a country's political climate can affect the neighbor countries, it cannot have a significant impact on all the neighbors of the neighbor countries. At the same time, the neighbors of the neighbor countries have a direct impact on these countries' political situation, so that the instrument should explain some fraction of this endogenous regressor. The GDP and democracy index are important but endogenous predictors of political instability. 6 We do not estimate the model for the sample restricted to developed countries because of the small sample size; many developed countries do not have contiguous neighbors and therefore cannot be included in the estimation. 7 This identification strategy has been introduced by Bramoullé, et al. (2009) to study the peer effects in
The idea behind the second instrument is that the average latitude over all the neighbors is a factor characterizing the region and is not influenced by the dependent variable, a given country's political instability. We use latitude squared because it has better fit that the linear latitude term.
Columns (4)- (5) and (9)- (10) of Table 2 report the IV estimation results. The neighbors' political instability remains a significant explanatory variable for a given country's political instability. The Hansen test suggests that the instruments are valid and the Cragg-Donald
Wald F-statistics imply that the instruments are relevant in all the specifications. When PIS 1 is considered as dependent variable, the exogeneity of neighbors' political instability cannot be rejected according to the endogeneity test, implying that OLS results are more efficient.
Notwithstanding, the OLS and IV results are very similar in all the cases, therefore we conclude that higher average neighbors' political instability leads to higher political instability in a given country, keeping other things constant. The estimated coefficients suggest that one unit increase in the average neighbors' political instability causes an increase in a given country's political instability from around half of a unit to around one unit, depending on the specification. The results are similar for the full sample and for the sample restricted to developing countries. The coefficients on the average neighbors' political instability are lower when the sample is restricted to developing countries. However, when computed over the average values, the impact of the average neighbors' political instability in the whole sample is not statistically different from that in the sample restricted to developing countries. This is due to the fact that political instability is greater in developing countries.
Given the significance of neighbors' influence on a given country's political climate, in the next section, we ask whether there is a possibility to reduce the negative impact of geographical neighbors by developing international relations with non-neighbor countries.
incomplete networks. The set of countries can be considered as a network with links representing relations across different countries. In this case, the network is incomplete if a country has links with its geographical neighbors but not with its neighbors' neighbors. Note: The top and bottom panels show the results for PIS 1 and PIS 2 measures of political instability, with AN P IS i defined as the average neighbors political instability PIS 1 and PIS 2, respectively. AN LPOP and AN LAREA denote the average neighbors' population and area, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Can Economic Relations Reduce the Neighbor Effect?
A country can potentially diversify the impact of its geographical neighbors by pursuing a more active role in international political and economic relations. We seek to answer this question by estimating a number of specifications of the following general model:
where, as before, P IS i denotes country i's measure of political instability, AN P IS i denotes country i's average neighbors' political instability, IN T ER i is a measure of the intensity of international relations, and X i is a set of country-specific control variables. The control variables are the same as those used in equation (1) . By considering the interaction term AN P IS i * IN T ER i , we evaluate whether more intensive international relations reduce the positive impact of political instability on a given country's political instability.
Measuring the Partner Effect
We consider three broad categories of the measures of intensity of international relations: The idea behind the use of these variables is that a country that actively participates in international intergovernmental organizations has more chances to diversify the inflow of political ideas from abroad and to use international organizations to partially protect itself from the negative impacts of politically unstable neighbors. 8 We exclude from consideration the organizations the participation in which is widespread with more than 90% of countries participating, such as the United Nations, or is characterized by membership of mainly developed countries, such as Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 9 The rule applied to count the number of memberships of this type is that there should be members in at least 60 countries, or else in more than 30 countries provided that the distribution between continents is "well-balanced." For estimation, we include one of the variables indicating participation in intergovernmental organizations at a time, to avoid multicollinearity. Table 3 ness is supposed to increase a country's possibilities to collaborate with foreign economies and, potentially, to reduce "the neighbor's curse." Analysis of the third category of variables describing international relations offers a potential explanation for this result.
The third category includes the main trade partners of the country, that is, the countries with which a given country has the largest trade flows. The first main trade partner is defined as the country with which a given country has the largest share of its trade flows.
The second main partner is defined as the country with which a given country has the largest share of its trade flows, excluding the first main trade partner, and so on. Table 6 The figure shows the average political instability and its standard errors (left panel) and the average logarithm of real GDP per capita and its standard errors (right panel) of the main trade partners-neighbors (in squares) and main trade partners-nonneighbors (in diamonds).
Around half of the countries in the sample (54%) have a non-neighbor country as the main trade partner; around a third of the countries have non-neighbor countries as the first two main trade partners; and only around 15% of the countries have non-neighbors as the first six main trade partners.
Before we saw that the main trade partners-nonneighbors are on average much more politically stable than the main trade partners-neighbors (Table 1 ). Now we check the characteristics of the other trade partners that have significant shares of trade flows in a given country. Figure 4 shows that the neighbors and non-neighbors main trade partners are quite different. There, we plot the average first, second, and so on till the eighth main trade partner's political instability (left panel) and the logarithm of real GDP per capita (right panel).
The main non-neighbor trading partners are persistently more politically stable and richer: the significant difference remains even for the eighth main trade partner.
We use information on the main trade partners to evaluate their impact on the degree to which neighbors' political instability affects a given country's political instability. The estimations of the model (2) with IN T ER i defined as the share of trade with one, two, and so on main trade partners, distinguishing between neighbors and non-neighbors, does not deliver a significant coefficient on the interaction term AN P IS i * IN T ER i . This suggests that the intensity of trade with non-neighbors does not help to reduce the influence of neighbors.
Next, we proxy IN T ER i by dummies for the country having one through eight main trade partners-nonneighbors, and estimate (2) using each of these dummies. Table 5 What is the intuition behind this result? Table 4 shows that having more trading partners- Table 5 suggest that this policy is efficient at reducing the neighbors' impact on a country's political instability.
Conclusion
This study investigated the relationship between a given country's and its neighbors' political instability and the ability of international non-neighbor partners to affect this relationship.
We found that regional instability defined as the average political instability of the contiguous countries has a strong positive effect on a given country's political instability. However, this effect can be reduced through active participation in international intergovernmental organizations or through economic relations with successful non-neighbor countries.
Our results suggest that policies targeting the development of international relations with 
